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~DIVIDUAL F~ANCIAL DECISIONS
IN RETIREMENT SAV~G PLANS AND
THE PROVISION OF RESOURCES
FOR RETIREMENT
ABSTRACT
Proposals for mandatory private saving accounts differ in the degree of investment discretion
that they provide to individual savers, and in their provisions for annuitization of accumulated assets.
With respect to investment choices, some argue that individuals must be prevented from investing
too conservatively, and earning low returns over their accumulation period, while others argue that
individuals should be protected from recklessly investing their retirement assets. With respect to
annuitization, there is concern that individuals might not choose annuities and would thereby expose
themselves to a risk of outliving their assets in a privatized system. This paper draws on the existing
experience with 401 (k) plans and other defined contribution pension plans to provide evidence on
each of these issues. We find that the share of401 (k) plan assets held in corporate equities has
increased substantially in recent years. We are only able to provide limited evidence on participant
asset management, since many 401 (k) plans have limited options in this regard. We do find,
however, that a participant’s education and income levels are related to asset allocation decisions,
with less educated and lower income participants less inclined to invest in equity securities. We also
analyze a unique data base on TIAA-CREF participants and find several attributes of annuitization
behavior that seem inconsistent with standard behavior in the lifecycle model.
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dwise@nber.harvard. eduTwo important design features in proposals to supplement or replace the current Social
security system with a system of individual saving accounts are the degree of individual
autonomy that would be allowed with respect to the investment of accumulating assets, and
with respect to tha distribu~ of accumulated assets. At one extreme are proposals that
would mandate the allocation of assets between stocks, bonds, and other investment
categories during the accum~tion phase, and require tie purchase of a government-provided
annuity at retiement. At the other extreme are plans that wodd aUow substantial individual
ohoice in ti investment of assets, and in the time profik and method of distributing
acctited assets.’
Assat allocation decisions can have important triplications for the rate of return on
retirement assets, and hence on the degree of retirement security that a given stream of
individual contributions during the working life can provide. The standard source of data on
long-term returns, Ibbotson Associates (1995], reports that since 1926, the distribution of
returns m a diversified portfolio of ccuporate stoch has a mean of 9.9 percent per year,
compared with a mean of 4.8 percent for a portfolio of long-term bonds and 3.8 percent,
hardy more than the infktion rate, for a poftfdio of short-term Treasury Mls. Siegel (1 994)
prasants _ ftiings using data from 1802-1992: the mean equity retwn is 8.1 percent,
the mean bond return 4.7 percent, and the mean inflation rate 1.3 percent. The expected
VW at retiemant of an ~urnulated retirement fund invested in equities is greater than the
expected value of one invested in lass risky fixed income assets, although there is also a
greater chance of having sustained losses on such l portfolio.
-tory saving plans that provide substantial investment discretion to individual
participants have led to discussion of two conflicting concerns regarding individual asset
‘Diamond and Valdes-%ieto (1994) and Feldstein (1996) discuss a range of issues that
arias in considering SocM Secwity reform proposals.4
management choices. One is the possibility that some individuals will invest conservatively,
thereby earning low rates of return on their account balances and thus not accumulating
sufficient resources to finance retirement consumption. The other concern is that some
individuals will invest their accounts recklessly, bearing substantial risk and incurring
substantial probability of reaching retirement with a very small accwnt accumulation. It is
in winciple possible that each of these investment patterns might apply to sme part of the
popdation, so that the group reaching retirement with low levels of reswrces would consist
o~ some conservative investors and some plungers. 2 Restricting asset allocation options
provides one way to avoid either of thesa wtcomes.
It is difficult to evaluate the importance of restricting individual investment choice,
since there has never been a universal system of retirement saving accounts in the United
States. A substantial fraction of U.S. households accumulates very little financial wealth (see
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994a)), instead relying primarily on Social Security and to a lesser
extent corporate pensions to sustain retirement consumption. Another grwp, which does
SCCumhte some fiml wealth, tends to hold only fixed-income instrwents in thair
portf~. It is difficdt to ga~e how such households would invest theti ratir~nt saving
assets, if they were provided with the chanca to ti so. A particularly difficult issue is how
a pOt@ntid reduction in the current level of Social Security benefits, which provide a real
annuity “floor” under retirement consumption, would affect asset allocation choices earlier in
the Iifetti.
A related set of issues arises with respect to paywts from mandatory saving accounts.
Ons of the risks that is partially insured by cwrent defined benefit pansion plans (through
~he average return to all investors in a cohort might not be affected by the presence of
some very conservative, and some risk-loving, investors, but the distribution of wealth at
retirement would be affected.5
annuity contracts purchased with the accumulation in defined contribution pension pJans) and
by Swial Security is the risk of outliving one’s resources. Mandatory saving plans that require
annuidzadon of accumulated balances at retirement or at a particular age, ~h as 65, also
provM a guar~a that resourcas will be spread over an individual’s rernting tifetime. Such
Mns also entail ti~hter restrictions on individual choice than plans that wouJd allow more
dscretion in asset withdrawal, and they may involve additional government involvement in
the ProviAon of annuities or the oversight of the private annuity market.
At the center of the discussions of both accumulation and withdrawal options are
questions of how individuals and couples would behave in a system of mandatory saving
accounts. One potential source of information on these issues is the behavior of participants
in various targeted retirement saving plans, such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs),
Salary Reduction Arrangements (SRAS), 401 (k) plans, and other self-directed defined
contribution pension plans. The growth of such targeted retirement saving plans has
expanded the set of individuals with substantial financial asset holdings and some discretion
regarding their investment. The participants in these @ans tend to have higher incomes than
non-participants, so there are immediate questions about the degree to which findings based
on such groups can be generalized to the population as a whole. Mvetiheless it seems
approprhte to examine the behavior of participants in these plana snd to extract what
information is available about accumulation and distribution behavior.
This paper considers a range of different saving vehicles that provide individuals with
some discretion in investment and some opportunity to choose the nature of their payouts,
including IRAs, SRAS, 401 (k) plans, the TIAA/CREF retirement system for college and
university employees, and the federal government’s thrift saving plan. It provides evidence
on individual financial decisias in these plans.6
The paper is divided into five sections. The first presents summary information on
participation in various retirement saving programs, drawing on data from the 1992 Survey
of Consumer Finances and the recently-released Health and Retirement Survey. Section two
summarizes asset atiocation decisions in a variety of the existing saving mans. We note that
available evidence from 401 (k) plan providers suggests that the equity allocation of new
contributions to 401 (k) ~ans is greater than that for the existing stock of assats, and that
there are differences by age and income in the asset allocation pattern in 401 (k) pJans.
Section three focuses on both accumulation and withdrawal decisions of TIAA-CREF
participants, and summarizes the allocation of retirement saving contributions between stocks
and fixed-income assets. The fourth section considers the demand for annuities among TIAA-
CREF participants, and relies in particular on a 1988 survey of both TIAA-CREF retirees to
explore how individual characteristics affect annuity demand. There is a brief conclusion that
suggests several issues for further investigation.
1. The Growth of Pa-tIon In Tar~d Retirement Savino PlaM
. . . .
In the last decade and a half,
substantially from defined-benefit
indivitils have taken advantage
tha structure of the private pension system has shifted
(08) to defined-contribution (DC) plans, and many
of opportunities for tax-deferred saving in targeted
retirement saving accounts. The result of these changes has been a shift, small for those
already retired but potentially much greater for those who will retire in the future, toward
retkement saving accounts that rely in some way on individual investment decisions.
The first substantial targeted retirement saving plan was the Individual Retirement
Account (IRA). IRAs were introduced for most households in 1981, and rose to substantial
popularity, with nearly 16 million contributors, before the 1986 Tax Reform Act curtailed the7
tax benefits for IRA participation by higher-income households. Since 1986 the flow of new
contributions to IRAs has been substantially reduced, but total assets in IRAs have continued
to grow as a resdt of roll-over contributions from other retirement plans, and the increase in
value of previousl y invested assets. By the end of 1995, Bernstein Research (1995) estimates
that nearly $1 trillion was held in IRAs.
In contrast to IRAs, a second targeted saving pJan, the 401 (k) plan (named after the
section of the Internal Revenue Code that created it), has expanded rapidly since the early
1980s. Although formally created in 1978, 401 (k)s did not gain popularity until after 1981,
when the Treasury Department issued clarifying regulations that made it possible for
employers to estabJish such plans. These plans have diffused rapidly through the work~ce,
first at large employers and then at smaller firms. 401 (k) participants can defer income tax
liability on their contributions. Assets in 401 (k) accounts accumulate tax-free and income
from these plans is taxed when the funds are withdrawn. Prior to 1987, employees could
contribute up to $30,000 each year to a 401 (k) plan. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced
the limit to $7,000 beginning in 1987 and instituted indexation for inflation in subsequent
years. Th contribution limit was $9,235 for the 1995 tax year. Wny empJoyers match
mpIOyeO contributions to 401 (k) plans, often at rates between 50 and 100 @rcent (we
Poterbe, Venti, and Wise (1994b)). The number of participants in 401 (k) @ans MS increased
from 7.5 million in 1984, to 15.2 million in 1988, to 22.4 million in 1992, the most recent
year for which the Department of Labor (1996) has released detailed information from IRS
Form 5500 filings. Bernstein Research (1995) estimates that the market value of assets in
401 (k) pJans was approximately $650 billion at the end of 1995, and that these assets will
increase rapidly in the future. Contributions to IRAs and 401(k) plans now exceed
contributions to traditional employer-provided defined benefit pension plans.8
Both IRAs and 401 (k)s provide individuals with opportunities to make financial
dactions about the investment of retirement plan assets, and about the distribution of these
assets after retirement age. Individuals have substantial the greatest discretion in investing
IRA assets. Although some assets, such as gdd and silver coins and hedge funds, could not
be held in lRAs until recently, thase restrictions are utikely to constrain the investment
choices of many IRA -pants. IRA assets can be withdrawn in various ways, including
lump-sum payouts at any aga (although such payouts before age 59 1/2 incur a 10 percent
penalty tax upon withdrawal), according to a schedule of participant age-specific minimum
distributions determined by the IRS, or by purchasing an annuity.
Participants in 401 (k) ~ns face less discretion than IRA investors with respect to
asset allocation. The available investment options are plan-specific and as such are
determined by h employer’s arrangement with tha 401 (k) provider. Since 1993, however,
Department of Labor guidelines have required that all 401 (k) #ans offer at least three
inva-nt options, including a broad-based equity fund, a bond fund, and a money market
fund. Many 401 (k) plans offer a more diverse range of investment options. Assets Can be
witMrawn from 401 {k) @ans at any time, although lump-sum withdrawals before age 59 1/2
that are n~ rolled-ovar into other taxdeferred redrarnent saving plans incur the same 10
parcent panalty tax as withdrawals from IRAs. Some401 (k) plans offer annuitization options,
while othars can be annuitized only if tha individual participant purchases an annuity in the
private insurance market.
To provide some information on the characteristics of current participants in IRAs and
401 (k) plans, Tabla 1 presents information on the age-spacific prevalence of IRA ownership,
and tha rate of 401 (k) participation in 1991. These patterns are important background
information given the data that will be presented below on the asset allocation of IRA and9
401 (k) participants. The data in the upper panel show that IRA participation rises with income
and also with age. More than 40 percent of those between the ages of 55 and 65 have
Individual Retirement Accounts, while only one quarter of those in a cohti twenty years
younger have such accounts. The prevalence of IRAs is also sharply rising in income. The
data on IRAs dy indicate that a respondent has an account, not that contributions to such
accounts were made in the survey year (1991). Thus it is possi~e that many of the
participants opened these accounts before 1986, and have continued to hold the accounts
without making contributions.3 Between 1986 and 1989, IRA contributions fell by roughly
seventy-five percent. Some IRA holders are also likely to have created these accounts as
vehicles into which to roll-over distributions from other tax-qualified retirement saving plans.
The center panel of Table 1 shows the probability of participating in a 401 (k) plan.
These probabilities vary relatively little by age, but once again rise substantially as income
increases. As the data in the lower panel of Table 1 show, most of the income-dependence
in 401 (k) participation rates arises from varying rates of 401 (k) eligibility, not from variation
in participation rates conditional on eligibility. The 401 (k) take-up rate for all eligibles was
70,8 percent in 1991, substantially higher than the IRA participation rate for all but the
highest income categories. It is possible that some of the participation in 401 (k)s at lower
income level reflects employer “helper” contributions that are made to include these
employees in the plan and thereby to satisfy nondiscrimination rules for plan qualification.
We have also explored the prevalence of IRAs and various salary reduction plans in the
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), an ongoing survey of 12,600 individuals between the
3Some individuals may have multiple Individual Retirement Accounts, and make
contributions in a given year to only one of these accounts.10
ages of 51 and 61 in 1992.4 The HRS questionnaire does not ask the same questions as the
SJPP survey instrument, but it is nevertheless possible to estimate the prevalence of IRAs,
defined contribution plans at the respondent’s current job and from former jobs, as well as the
prevalence of other tax-deferred saving vehicles suchas401 (k)s and 403(b)s. The results are
shown in Table 2.
The HRS findings are broadly consistent witi those from the SIPP. For IRAs, the HRS
data suggest that 36.1 percent of respondents have an IRA or an IRA and a 401 (k) plan. Of
the 8.4 percent of the respondents who are shown as “other multi~e” in Table 2, 7.7 percent
report having an IRA, so the total IRA participation is 43.8 percent for the HRS respondents.
This compares with 35.3 percent for the 45-54 age group, and 43.8 percent for the 55-64
aoe group, in the SIPP data shown in Table 1. With respect to 401 (k) pJans, the HRS data
suggest that 14.8 percent of respondents participate; this percentage is somewhat lower than
in tha SIPP sample.
The SIPP and HRS data suggest that IRAs and 401 (k) participation is not randomly
distributed across the income distribution, but tends to increase with age and income.5 The
sample of participants in these plans will therefore provide more information on the investment
decisions of older, higher-income grwps that are more tikely to participate in these plans than
on younger, low~ome workers who are not. We address these issws in our subsequent
adysis by stratifying housahoJds by age and income where possible.
‘Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995b) analyzed the HRS data in studying the utilization of
lump-sum distributions from defined contribution plans.
5This is why studies of the saving effects of these retirement saving pJans, such as
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995a), stratify households by income level in carrying out saving
comparisons.11
2. ~sse~ Allocation Patterns in Ret ementsav ng plans ir i
This section presents information on the asset allocation of retirement saving plans.
We begin by presenting survey-based information from the 1992 Survey of Consumer
Finances, which asked respondents about investment patterns in IRAs, salary-reduction
arrangements (SRAS) such as employer thrift plans, and 401 (k) and traditional defined
contribution pension pJans (DC @ans). We then present information from other sources, such
as industry association tabulations on asset allocation decisions in IRAs and 401 (k) plans or
specialized tabulations on asset allocation in the federal government’s Thrift Saving Plan.
Each of these different methods of obtaitig information provides some evidence on current
patterns of household asset allocation.
%1 SUWV lnformati~n from the ~ev of Consumer Finances
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is a stratified random sample of U.S.
housaMds administered by the Federal Reserve Board. It is designed to gather detailed
information on assets, liabilities, and demographic characteristics. To collect useful
infwmation on asset hoJdings, in light of the skewed distributions of many types of financial
snd real assets, each survey oversamples high income hwsehdds. Each SCF contains an
area-probatitity sam~ts, which is a stratified random sampIe of housahdds chosen from the
population at large, and a stratified random sample of households drawn from a set of high-
income tax returns. Both samples are surveyed using the same questionnaire, but missing
value imputations in the public release versions are typically done separately. We use the
most recent publicly-available survey, the 1992 SCF, to provide some information on asset
docation patterns in IRAs, 401 (k) and 403(b) plans and other supplemental retirement
accounts, and traditional defined contribution pension plans. The latter category in the SCF12
includes profit sharing or thrift plans and Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPS).e
TabJe 3 presents data on the fraction of assets in each of these retirement saving
vehicles that are held in the form of corporate stock or mutual funds that invest primarily in
corporate equities.’ The data are stratified by age in each case. The resdts show that
approximately half of the assets in each of these accounts are held in corporate equities. At
least for the individuals who are currently participating in these plans, it therefore appears that
equity investment is viewed as an important aspect of accumulating assets for retirement.
There are apparent differences in age-specific rates of equity ownership, with those over the
age of 65 showing a lower equity fraction of IRA and SRA assets than comparable, but
younger, individuals.
One difficulty in evaluating resuJts such as those in Table 3 is that it is not clear what
“theory” suggests we should find. There is no presumption that house~ds of different ages
should allocate the same fraction of their portfolio to equities. Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson
(1992) develop an argument for reducing equity exposure as households age, and Samuelson
(1989, 19901 discusses arguments for age-related variation in equity holding.” Similarly, if
househtis view their retirement accounts as part of a broader portfoJio selection pro~em,
one must analyze their overall investment decisions rather than auocation choices in these
~he critical limitation of the SCF for studying this question, and a limitation of most
survey data on retirement saving plan asset allocation, is that we do not know whether the
retirement plan is self directed. In some plans the plan sponsor may restrict asset allocation
choices, for example by contributing all employer contributions to a pension plan to an
account that holds onJy company stock.
7A related discussion and data summary may be found in the General Accounting Office
(1 996) study.
‘Even if households reduce equity exposure as they age, they may still want to hdd
equities after retirement because of the long life expectancy for many couples at retirement
age.13
accounts alone. For individuals who face high marginal tax rates on interest income, for
example, holding bonds rather than equities in their tax-favored retirement accounts may
provide higher after-tax portfolio returns than alternative portfolio profiles.
es of Information on IRA and 401 (k) Asset Allocation P~
In addition to survey information like that c~tained in the SCF, it is a[so poasiMe to
obtain data on asset allocation in IRAs and some other categories of retirement saving
accounts from financiaJ industry sources that monitor aggregate trends. Information of this
type is presented for IRAs in Table 4, which shows data for 1989 and 1994. These data are
disaggregate by tha type of financial institution holding the IRA, but this provides a
reasonable guide as to the assets held in the account. In 1989, commercial banks, credit
unions, and thrift institutions accounted for 49.1 % of all IRA assats. IRAs with these
institutions were presumatiy invested in various fixed-income securities. Adding money
market mutual funds and bond and income funds to these assets brings the total of fixed-
income assets to 62.2%. By 1994, the share of assets in these fixed-income categories had
declined to 40.3%. Equity mutual funds increased from 11 .5% to 16.7% of IRA assets
dining this ~iod, but the sharpest ~ease (from 18.1% to 34.6%) was in “other self-
directed” ~ts. The data from the Survey of Consurner Finance suggest that various types
of equity investment are likely to account for a substantial share of this category.
The best source of aggregate information on401 (k) plan asset allocation is the annual
set of IRS Form 5500 fitings, most recently published for 1992 data in Department of Labor
(1996). These show 401 (k) plan assets of $510.2 billion, with employer securities
(presumably company stock) worth $88.2 billion, or 17.3% of the total. Identifiable interest-
baaring assets, which include interest-baaring cash, CDs, corporate and government debt, and14
various loans, totalled $60 billion, or 11 .2°A of the total. Common and preferred stock direct
holdings totalled $45.7 billion, or 9% of all assets. ‘Indirect investments,” which are not
identified by the nature of the underlying securities on Form 5500, are an important and
unallocated category, including $101.9 billion in “interests in master trusts,” $47,2 billion in
registered investment companies, $75.6 billion in insurance company general accounts, and
$26.9 billion in unspecified general investments.
The coarse informatia on Form 5500 has led to a number of private sectw surveys
of 401 (k) plan asset allocation. Such surveys are based on a subset of existing 401 (k) pJans,
and whether the plans included in each survey are representative of the broader population
of plans is difficult to evaluate. Nevertheless these surveys provide an important source of
evidence on the evolving pattern of 401 (k) asset allocation. Table 5 presents this type of data
from two different surveys over the 1988-1995 period. These surveys, by Access Research
and IOMA, have been conducted periodically since the late 1980s or early 1990s. The survey
findings suggest that there are some differences in results across the two surveys, even in
a given year, but the trends in two surveys over time are similar.
There are several noteworthy findings in Table 5. First, consistent with the Survey of
c onsumer Finance evidence, approximately half of 401 (k) assets are currently invested in
equities. However, the data ~esented here suggest that a higher fraction of 401 (k) assets
than othar equity assets are invested in shares the company where an individual works. There
is a correspondingly lower investment fraction in diversified national or international equity
Portfolios. The Access Research findings suggest 43% in corporate equities or company
stock, with another 14% in balanced funds that would include some equity holdings. The
lOMA findings suggest 55% in corporate equities, without further detail as to breakdown.
The data from the Form 5500s, and the Access Research results, suggest that one important15
feature of 401 (k) plans is thek substantial holdings of company stock. One reason for the
significant level of such holdings is that employers sometimes channel their matching funds
into accounts that are limited to hoJding corporate stock. In such cases employees may have
some discretion in the investment of their own contributions, but have no control over the
investment of em~oyer contributions.e
The second significant finding in Table 5 is that the share of 401 (k) assets held in
equity securities has increased substantially during the last half decade. Both the Access
Research and the IOW data suggest a sharp increase, with an 8 percent increase between
1992 and 1995 in the latter. This trend toward equity investment coincides with a decline
in the ~re of Guaranteed Investment Contracts (GICS). The tr~ toward greater equity
holdings may be the result of several factors: high equity returns raising the relative asset
share of these securities, even if 401 (k) investors hdd fixed their contribution allocation
between equities and fixed income assets; declining nominal long-term interest rates, which
have made GICS less attractive in the eyes of some investors; rising expectations of future
equity returns, driven in part by extrapolative expectations and the recent period of strong
equity returns.
The 401 (k) asset allocation choice reflects two decisions: one by employers with
regard to which investment options to offer, and a second by employees with respect to
which investments to choose, given the available menu. Broad choice is now the rule, rather
9How individuals adjust their portftio holdings to the existence of corporate defined
benefit plan accounts held in company stock is an imptiant unresolved issue. If individuals
do recognize the employer’s contribution, and pursue the imperfect hedging strategy of
reducing their hoJdings of equity in general to offset the holding of employer shares, then the
data suggest that individuals seek to hold roughly half of their assets in equities. If they do
not consider the employer contributions, however, then it becomes appropriate to subtract
this 20% of the value of401 (k] assets from both the equity holdings and from the total value
of these accounts. This suggests an equity share of sJightly less than 40%.16
than the exception, in 401 (k) plans. A recent RogersCasey (1996) survey found that only 1
percent of401 (k) participants worked at firms with only a single investment option; 2 percent
had two options, 6 percent three options, 9 percent four options, 18 percent five options, and
74 percent had six or more investment options. More than three quarters of 401 (k)s offer an
actively managed domestic equity investment vehicle, compared with 62 percent offering a
money market fund, 61 percent offering a stable value fund, and 60 percent offering a U.S.
balanced fund.
Table 6 presents information from the 1994 Access Research (1995) survey that
shows both the availa~ity of various investment options, and the use of these options given
their availability. The data show that roughly 60% of individuals make at least some use of
equity mutual funds when they are included in the opportunity set. Index funds and
international equity funds are somewhat less popular, conditional on availability, than various
types of growth funds. The data in Table 6 shed some light on the role of company stock
(shares in the firm that employs the workers who participate in the plan) in 401 (k) @ans, and
suggests that some individual purchase company stock even though they are not required to
do so by plan regulations. 10 While less than half of the 401 (k) participants surveyed had a
company stock investment option in their401 (k) plan, nearly 60 percent invested in com~ny
stock if this option was avaiJable. Company stock, GICS, and various growth-oriented e~ity
mutual funds have the three highest takeup rates conditional on availability.
AM of the foregoing data focused on aggregate docation patterns in 401 (k) assets,
with no information on how individuals in different circumstances choose to allocate their
assets. Table 7 presents information drawn from Goodfellow and Schieber’s (1996) analysis
10Whather em~oyers exert tacit pressure for purchasing company stock in retirement
accounts is an open issue.17
11 The table shows the fraction of almost 36,000 participants in twenty-four 401 (k) plans.
of 401 (k) plan assets held in each asset category, by the age of plan participant.12 The data
show clear asset allocation differences across age groups. Younger plan participants are more
likely to invest their 401 (k) assets in stock funds or company stock than are older workers.
The fraction of assets in the three equity categories, domestic or international stock funds and
company stink, declines from 52.9 Permnt for those aged 21-30, to 30.3 percent for those
in their fifties and 13.4 percent for those over the age of 60.13
Table 8 presents analogous information with participants disaggregate by income
level. Since the analysis is based on 401 (k) plan records, income in this context represents
wage and salary income from the plan-sponsoring firm, not total family income. As with age,
there is a dear pattern in asset allocation by income category. Higher income earners allocate
substantial! y larger shares of their 401 (k) assets to equity securities. For participants with
incomes between $15,000 and $25,000, for example, 29.9 percent of 401 (k) assets are held
in equities, compared with 59.4 percent for those with incomes between $75,000 and
$100,000, and 64.5 percent for those with incomes above $100,000. The fraction of assets
1lThe Em~oyee -fit Research Institute (1996b) presents a related analysis of the a-t
allocati~ tices of investors in three large 401 (k) plans. The resuJts are broadly consistent
with - from the large sample of plans analyzed by Goodfellow and Schieber (1 996).
l~he entrias in the total column raise some questions abwt the comparability of this
sample with the 401 (k) universe. The share of assets held in company stock is substantial y
kss than that for al! 401 (k) pJans, with a correspondingly greater ~re of fixed income
investments.
13Goodfellow and Schieber (1996) also present data on the fraction of401 (k) participants
who auocate nona of their contributions to equity investments (31.2 percent of the total
sample, with some age variation as suggested by 29.2 percent for those aged 21-30, 30.6
percent for those between 41 and 50, and 52.3 percent for those over 60), and the fraction
who allocate more than 60 percent of their contributions to equities (36.7 percent for the 21-
30 group, 30.7 percent for those 41-50, 18.8 percent for those 60+, and 31.4 percent of
the entire sample).18
heJd in balanced funds also increases with income, while the allocation to fixed income funds
faus roughly in half between the lowest and highest income categories.
The relationship between income and the share of contributions allocated to equities
in the G@ fellow and Schiaber (1996) data parallels our earlier finding from the Survey of
c onaumar F-es, but the W bstween participant age and contribution mix (Table 6) is
much stionger than in the Survey of Consumer Finances. This may be due to tha difference
between the definition of “age= in the SCF and in data bases with information on
individuals.14 Because SCF respondents are asked about the financial status of their
household, participation in a 401 (k) means that someone in the house~d has a 401(k)
account. Household age is determined by the aga of the household head, with is a noisy
measure of the age of actual participants. This could weaken the relationship between age
and the behavior of participants as measured in the SCF. 16
It is difficult to evaluate IRA and 401 (k) asset allocation choices in the absence of a
benchmark, darived either from theoretical analysis of the return distributions and
consumpti needs confratkg investors, or from othar sources. One possibla comparison
is the current assat mix in these ~ns relative to that in defined benefit pension pJans. In
19S4, Bernstein Research (1995) reports that thesa plans held 46% of their assets in
mstic equity, 11 % in international equities, 28% in btis, 5% in GICS, 3% in red estate,
and 7% in other assets. IRA and 401 (k) investment patterns thus reflect a much greater
14 Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (19961 analyze asset aUocation decisions in a single large
defined contribution plan, and find some avidance that both younger workers and ddar
workers are more likely to Nd assets in fixed-income instruments than are middle-aged
workers. This resdt may be driven by their use of a quadratic specification in meddling the
age-dependence of asset holdings, or by special characteristics associated with the defined
contribution plan under analysis.
lGAnother possibility is that the Goodfellow-Schieber data set reflects an unrepresentative
sample of 401 (k) p~icipants, but we have no way to address this issue.19
holding of GICS, and a somewhat lower level of equity investment, but they are not
dramatically different from the asset allocations of defined benefit pension assets. 10
3~n In TWO Retirement Savina SYS-
. .
The discussion so far has considered asset alJocatM in Individual Retirement
Accounts, which are available (at least in some form) to all individuals with current earned
income, and 401 (k) plans, which are broadly available in the private sector. In this section
we draw on the experience of two more specialized retirement saving programs, the Thrift
Saving Plan for federal government employees and the TIAA-CREF system for employees of
educational institutions, to address similar issues of asset allocation.
tion FxDerience in the Federal Fmo]ovee Thrift Savin~ Plan
The federal government’s retirement system includes an option for voluntary
contributions to the federal thrift savings plan (TSP), which is structured along the lines of
most 401 (k) plans. In early 1995, the TSP had two million participants and nearly $27 billion
under management, according to Hinz, MCarthy, and Turner (1996). Employee contributions
to the TSP are made on a pre-tax basis. The fedaral government matches, dollar-fordollar,
em~oyae TSP contributions up to three percent of salary, and 50 cents-on-thedollar for the
next two percent of salary. Contributions to the TSP are constrained by the same contribution
limits as 401 (k) contributions at private sector employers, although there are no
discrimination ruJes constraining the distribution of contributions to the TSP.
Table 9 shows the percentage of workers choosing to make contributions to the TSP
lYhe merits of this comparison may be questioned on the grounds that defined banefit
plan assets are managed to achieve objectives of an infinite-lived agent, the plan’s corporate
sponsor, and are insured by a government agency, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.20
in 1993. In contrast to the private sector experience with 401 (k) plans, where participation
in these plans conditional on eligibility exceeds 60 percent even at low income levels (see
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1 995a)), participation in the TSP is below 50 percent at income
levels below $20,000 per year, and rises to 96 percent at income levels above $70,000. The
federal government automatically contributes one percent of salary to the TSP for all
employees; this is not considered “participation” in this table.
The federal Thrift Saving Plan historically offered more limited investment options than




1987, all TSP contributions had to be invested in a
This requirement was gradually ~ased wt between
1987 and 1991. Since 1991, TSP assets can be allocated between three different funds,
without restriction. Participants are allowed tore-allocate assets that have accumulated from
pre-1 987 contributions, as well as to allocate new contributions, among three funds: a
government securities fund which earns the average market return on marketable Treasury
securities with more than four years to maturity, a Iarge%apitalization stock fund that invests
in tha S&P 500, and a fixed income fund that invests primarily in a Shearson Lehman Hutton
commingled Government/Corporata bond index fund. The General Accwnting Office (1995)
reports that at tha beg- of 1995, 70 parcent of the assets in the federal thrift plan were
invested in fedaral securities fund, while 6 percent were held in a commercial bond fund and
24 percent in tha corporate equit y fund. The equit y fund is currently attracting a higher share
of contributions (35 percent in August 1994) than its share of assets, but participants have
apparently made Iittla use of a post-1990 provision permitting re-allocation of funds that were
contributed during the period when au contributim were directad to the government bond
fund.
17yinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1 996) provide an overview of federal Thrift Saving Plan.21
TIAA-CREF is the retirement saving system for employees of colleges, universities, and
some other nonprofit institutions. It includes university faculty as well as staff. Many TIAA-
CREF participants, like employees of the federal government, are better educated than
randomly-selected individuals in the population, so analysis of their retirement saving behavior
may not be com~tely repre~tative of all who might participate in a mandatory, economy-
wide saving system. Nevertheless, one important benefit of analyzing the TIAA-CREF data
is that we can obtain individual-level data as well as aggregate information on asset allocation
choices.
Eecause TIAA-CREF is a financial service provider, individual data recwds suffer from
the sa~ limitations as participant recordsin401 (k) pJans, notably the lack of information on
demographic cbacteristics and house~d income. However, two special data bases, the
1993 Premium Paying Research Panel and the 1988 Participant Survey, have been collected
in recent years, and each of these data bases has detailed information on individual attributes.
Both surveys include a set of questions about participant retirement and financial pJanning,
and they Povti valuable information for studying participant decisions. The decision we
focus on is the choice between allocating funds to TIAA accounts, which are invested in
portfolios of fixed-income instruments, and CREF accounts, most of which we invested in
equities .18
Table 10 presents information on the current asset allocation choices of TIAA-CREF
@writs, as well as tk atiocation of existig balances between CREF and TIAA accounts.
In 1993, TIAA accounts attracted 38 percent of contributions (contributions to TIAA CREF
l“Since 1988, CREF has offered a Money Market Account, and since 1990, CREF has
offered a ~nd Market Account. When the survey data were collected in 1988, however,
virtually all CREF assets were invested in equities.22
are frequently referred to as premiums). 1e There is a clear link between
the fraction of contributions allocated to fixed-income instruments. The
age, income, and
TIAA share is 32
percent for those under the age of 35. It rises to 38 percent for those between the ages of
45 and 54, and then to 53 percent for those over the age of 65 who are still making
contributions to TIAA-CREF. The fraction devoted to TIM declines by more than fifteen
percentage points as we move from individuals with incomes of less than $25,000 to those
with incomes above $100,000.
The fraction of total TIAA-CREF assets held in TIAA accounts is remarkatiy similar to
the asset atiocation mix of current contributions. This reflects the combined effect of an
increase over time in the share of contributions that participants have allocated to CREF
accounts, and the greater return on equities than on bonds. The first effect would cause the
contribution -e going to TIAA to fall below the share of existing assets held in TIAA
accounts, while the second effect works in the opposite direction.
3.3 Patilcw Level Evidence on Allocation Declslons in TIAA-CRE
. . . . . F
To ftiher ex~we the factors that affect asset allocation choices, we obtained data
from the 1988 TIAA-CREF Participant Survey. This unique data base has been usad by
Laitner and Justar (1996) to stud y the determinants of intergenerational altruism; the data are
described in detail in Juster and Laitner (1990). In addition to information on tha percentage
of TIAA-CREF accumulation held in each type of account, drawn from participant records, the
data base also includes information on participant and other famtiy income, financial assets
and other components of net worth, and various demographic characteristics. We use this
‘9CREF attracted 43 percent of premiums, with the other 19 percent of premiums allocated
to hybrid accounts or other specialized accounts.23
information to estimate simple regression equations of the following form:
(1) %TIAA = aO + al* AGE + az*MARRIED + a~*FEMALE + a4*lNCOME
+ X ~,i*EDUC, + 1 ~,i*WEALTHj + c.
EDUC, denot~ a sat of indicator variables for particular ranges of education, and WEALTHi
similarly denotes a set of indicator variables for nat worth in various categories. Nat worth
is defined as the sum of all f~ assets nat of dabta, ~ the reported va&Js of housing,
- real estate, boats, autos, life insurance, trusts, and businesses owned. INCOME
corresponds to family income, so it includes both income that the TIAA-CREF participant may
earn outside the educational institution, as well as income earned by others in the household.
The median asset share in TIAA for this sample is 43 percent, and the mean is 52 percent.
These values are highar than in the 1993 data shown in TabJe 9, consistent with the view
that TIAA-CREF participants have becorna increasing y equity-oriented over tirne.m
Table 11 presents the results of estimating these regression models. The ta~e shows
three different specifications with respect to education and wealth. The only demographic
variable that affects asset aUocation in all three specifications is the gender of the respondent;
woman systamaticalJy invest approximately four percent more of their accumulation in TIAA
SOcounta. 21 Family incoma, education, and h~ net worth are also related to assat
~uti choicas. With respect to family home, tha only category indicator that enters the
equations in a statistically significant fashion is that for family income above $100,000.
Participants from such households allocate batween five and seven percent less of their TIAA-
‘Assets in CREF accounts can be transferred into a TIAA account, but once assets have
bean pJaced in a TIAA account, thay may not be reallocated to a CREF account. This places
constraints on tha spaed with which tha aggregate TIAA-CREF portfolio can shift from bonds
to stocks.
‘lThis finding also appears in other data sets; see in particular Hinz, McCarthy, and
Turner’s (1996) analysis of data from the federal Thrift Savings Plan.24
CREF assets to TIAA than do pafiicipants from households with incomes below $50,000 per
year. These results are consistent with earlier evidence, for 401 (k) clans and IRAs,
suggesting that higher income households are more likely to choose equity investments. With
respect to education, the only important distinction is between those TIAA-CREF participants
with twelve or fewer years of schooling, and those with more than 12 years of schooling.
The former group allocates more than ten percent more of its portfolio to TIAA than does the
combinad more educated group.
3-4 ln~
Similar asset allocation patterns emerge with respect to household net worth.
Participants from households with net worth above $250,000 allocate approximately fwr
percent less of thair TIAA-CREF accumulation to TIAA, but there are no statistically significant
differences in the asset allocation patterns of participants from households with net worth
below this level. The results in Table 11 support the evidence from other sources that
suggest that high income, high net worth individuals are more likely to allocate retirement
saving assets to equities than are their counterparts from Iower-tiome, lower-net worth
~s.
Our ubiquitw finding that Iowar-incm, less-educated individuals sllocata a smaller
sharts of ratirarnent plan assets to equities can be interpreted in either of two ways. First, it
is possibb that these individuals are more risk averse than higher-income, batter-educated
individuals, and that they are choosing different asset allocations because of this underlying
difference in preferences. The second, alternative, interpretation, is that these individuals do
not correctly parceive the higher expected returns associated with equity investing, and that
they are making an optimization error by holding too large a share of their portfolio in fixed-25
income assets.
One way to distinguish between these alternative views might involve studying how
participant education affects asset allocation choices. If 401 (k) and other retirement pJan
partic~pants in low income classes choose to hold a higher fraction of their assets in equity
after they have been exposed to information on portfolio returns, then the optimization error
view may receive some sup- relative to the risk aversion ex~anation. The Employee
Benefit Research Institute (1996a) reports that asset allocation is one of the most frequent{ y
covered topics in participant education programs at firms with 401 (k) plans or similar
retirement savin~ options. The impact of this education on asset choices is an important issue
for further investigation.zz
4. Ew~ De-
Tha extent to which individuals would use the proceeds accurndated in mandatory
saving accounts to purchase annuities is another important issue in evaluating and designing
such @ans. Rdatively few household surveys explicitly inquire about income received from
indiviti annuity contracts. The Health and Retirement Survey did include such a question,
but since the respondents were typically in their fifties, it is not surprising that the resulting
prevalence of annuity income, 1.57 percent, was low. 23 Perhaps more relevant, in the HRS
sample dy 8.0 percent of respondents who had previously worked for an employer with a
defined contribution pJan reported that they had selected an annuity as the method of payout
22 Miti, VanDerhai, and Yakoboski (1996) present some information on the assat
allocation choices of individuals in 401 (k) plans with different types of participant education
systems, but they do not report ‘before and after” asset allocation patterns.
‘~he mean annual annuity payout reported by those who indicate that they receive
annuity income is #13,496.26
fw their accumulated DC plan assets. Other possibJe responses to this question included
withdrawing the money, rolling it over into an IRA, and allowing it to accumulate.
4.1 WOW Current Retirees Moose to Pur~
A more valua~e source of information on potential anntity demand is the 1988 TIAA-
CREF survey of annuitants, which paralleled the survey of TIAA-CREF contributors discussed
above but waa adtistered dy to annuity reci~ts. X Annuities are only one of the ways
TIAA-CREF participants can withdraw their accumulated account balances. Although rare
during the time period corresponding to this survey, participants could also choose lump sum
payouts w withdrawals of several substantia~y equal payments. The 1988 survey focused
ody on those participants who had reached the distribution phase of their saving plan, and
who had chosan the annuity option.2s TIAA-CREF offers a variety of potential annuity
options, including participating annuities (with a low guaranteed payout rate but historically
substantial dvidends) for TIAA participants and variable annuities based on a range of
different ~fdos for CREF participants.
Om of the quastions on the TIAA-CREF annuitant survey was “If yw unexpectedly
received $100,000, what would you do with it?” Just over one quarter of the respondents,
26.5 percent, indicatad that they would wchasa an annuity. This fraction did not vwy
substantially as a function of respondent age. RwgM y the same fraction, 24.5 percent,
indicated that they wwld either spend roughly $16,000 per year (which wtid exhaust the
‘~he assat allocation patterns between TIAA and CREF in the participant and annuitant
surveys are similar. At the lowest education and net worth levels, there is a pronounced
tendency for greater investment in TIAA rather than CREF.
‘Some participants tight have stopped contributing to TIAA-CREF, but not yet begun to
withdraw thair accumulation. They would not be included in the survey.27
windfall in abwt eight years), or $10,000 per year (windfall exhausted in about twelve years.
Thirty seven percent of the respondents indicated that they wwld consume only the income
from the windfall, and abwt twelve
annual income from this windfall.
percent reported that they wwld spend less than the
It is important to recognize three features of the TIAA-CREF annuitant group that
makes them special fw the purpose of analyzing annuity demand. First, all of the survey
participants have both a real annuity from Social Security and another annuity payout from
TIAA-CREF.M Their responses may consequent y not describe the
households who do not have annuity couurage beyond Social Security,
responses of retired
or the responses that
would be observed if the current Social Sacurit y system were pared back.. Second, most of
the respondents are drawn from the upper quintile of the U.S. income and wealth distributions
(see Laitner and Juster (1 996)), althwgh thay are not Iikel y to represent the very highest
income
lifetime
and wealth strata of the population. If the demand to bequeath assets is related to
incorna, then this group may provide a guide to the annuity demands of ~y a part
of the wpulation. Third, the TIAA-CREF participants may have access to annuities on more
favorable terms than individuals in the privata marketplace, and may be assuming that they
wti ~chase additional annuities on such tarms.
while
respondent’s
recognizing these limitations, we a~ored the factors that affect the
answer regarding how a windfaU would be allocated.’7 Our ap~oach follows
hlAA-CREF participants who purchase standard annuities can choose between simple
nominal annuities and “graded” policies in which the stream of payments is backloaded in part
to offset the effacts of inflation. Thus TIAA-CREF annuitants are not necessarily holding
Sirn@e nominal annuities in addition to their Social Security real annuity.
270na difficdt y with surveys of this type is ‘surveyor preference bias:” respondents
attempt to provide what they believe the survey-taker believes is the “correct” answer. It is
difficult to know how important biases of this type are likely to be in this data set.28
the regression strategy that we used above to investigate the share of assets that TIAA-CREF
Particim hold in TIAA accounts. We now estimate linear probability models for each of
the possible responses to the qwstions on windfall use, Nustratod for exam~ by
BUYANNUITY, which equals unity if the respondent indicated that he or she would purchase
an annuity with the windfall proceeds:
(2) BUYANNUITY = #0 + #l l AGE + ~z*MARRIED + #~* FEMALE + ~a*SOCSEC
+ #~*KIDS + E #e,l*EDUCj + Z f17,j*WEALTH, + E.
The family income varide from the earlier specification is now replaced ~h a variati
measuring tha house~’s Social Security benefits, which proxy for a ranking of tifetime labor
income. We also augment the eartier specification with a varia~e indicating whether or not
the house~ has children, since that may be a proximate determinant of annuity demand.
The resuJts of estimating this equation are shown in Table 12, and they suggest that
it is difficult to fti simplta patterns in the responses to these questions. The only robust
-i- f~ti is t~t TIU-CREF participants with c~ren are less likely to cho~ an
annuity w a rapid “spend-down” plan, and more likely to pursue policies that preserve their
capital, than are participants without children. There is some evidence that married
respondents are less likely to annuitize a windfall than are other respondents; this may indicate
a belief that tha question is Iirnited to individual annuitias, which terminate at th death of the
annuitant (a married coupJe could also choosa a jointand survivor’s annuity). There is also
weak evidanca that respondents in the lower pordcan of the net w~h distribution are more
IiMy to say that they would spend thair windfd than are those in the higher parts of the
distititia. Ona puzzling feature is that the pravalanca of spendi~-down among those with
the lowest net worth, less than $50,000, is lower than among those in the $50-$250,000
net worth range. The estimates in the last cdurnn of Table 12, which correspond to the29
response that recipients would spend less than the current income from the windfall, do not
show any robust patterns.
4.,2 Cur~t ~ Pm at TIM-CW
. . .
One issue that Tl~-CREF data can edighten is the type of annuity contracts that
i~iduals purchase when they do purchase annuities. TIAA-CREF retirement annuity
contiacts can be written on a single life or two lives (typically to provide for the participant
and a spouse), and these contracts can be written as simple annuities, in which the payouts
ceasa whan the annuitant(s) die, or as annuities with guarantees that payments will be made
for a certain period, even if the annuitant(s) do not survive for this period.n In a standard
Iifecycle setting without bequest motives, the simple annuity, which provides a higher monthly
payout in each period when the annuitant is alive than any of the guaranteed options,
domimtes the other choices.ze
Tabk 13 presents information on the choice of annuity @icy by TIAA-CREF
~icipants who contracted for annuities in 1978 and in 1994. The ta~ shows both single-
Iife and joint-life annuity policies. King (1996) reports that in 1978, 44 percent of the
annuitias contracted for by male TIAA-CREF participants were single-life policies, compared
with 26 percent of such policies in 1994. For w-n, the respective percentages of single-
Iifa -s were 81 percent (1 978) and 68 percent (1 994).
Ths table shows that simple annuities without gwantee provisions account for only
‘-Yws-certain” annuities are life annuities with a guarantee that payments will be made
for at least some number of years.
Whis assumes that the available annuity policy is actuarially fair for the potential
purchaser. In practice, since TIAA-CREF uses a unisex tife table to price annuities, it cwld
ba the case that poJicies other than a simple annuity are optimal for some participants.30
about me third of all single annuity policies, but less than fifteen percent of joint life policies.
Policies with certain payout periods of fifteen years or more account for more than one third
of the single+ife annuities chosen by both men and women in 1994, and they account for
nearly two-thirds of the two-life policies. Since the guarantee provisions in annuity contracts
only become operative when the annuitit dies, in the case of single-life policies, or when
~ annuitants die, in the case of two-life policies, the widespread choice of annuities with
guaratees casts doubt M the vafue of the simple Iifecycla model as a starting point for
describing househofd annuity demand.
4.3 Theore~ of the Utlllty Gain from An~atlo~
. . ,..
To provide some perspective on the utility consequences of choosi~ to amuitize a
giv~ amount of wealth, we present illustrative calculations similar to those in Kotlikoff and
Spivak(198 1)and Friedman and Warshawsky (1990). We consider an individual who derives
utility from consumption each month according to a standard iso-elastic utility function, U~ =
(C,l~ -1 V(I -#), where B is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. When # = 1, this utdity
function yields the special case of logarithmic utility. We assume that an individual faces a
proba~ty of daath each month that corresponds to the annual mortatity rates reported in the
1996 Social Security Actuary’s cohort life table for man bwn in 1930 (i.e., 65-year-dds in
1995). We assume that no one lives beyond age 115, and that lifetime expected utility for
a man aged 65 is given by
115
(3) v = ~ pt+(l + ~“’*u(c,)
t=65
where P, denotes the survival probability (to age t) for a sixty-five year dd white man and 6
is the individual’s time preference rate.31
We first compute the expected lifetime utility associated with a “home-made
annuitization” policy that involves consuming an amount in each period that equals current
wealth divided by life expectancy. m This im~ies that wealth evolves accordkg to:
(4) w t+l = (1 + r)Wt - (l/~) *W,
where r is the real rate of return. We assume that an individual has accumdeted assets of
100 at age 65, find the value of V (which we denote V~) that corresponds to this
consumption strategy.
Next, we assume that the individual can purchase an actuarially fair real annuity at age
65. We find the level of wealth at age 65 that wodd generate the same Iifatime expected
utility as the home-made annuity appJkd to wealth of 100 at age 65. Tha ratio of this wealth
to 100 indicates how much the wealth of the 65-year-old could reduced, while leaving him
at tha sama lifetime expectad ut~ity level, if he had accass to an actuarially fair annuity
market. We perform a similar calcdation assuming that only nominal annuities are availa~e,
but again maintaining the assumption that these policies are actuarially fair.
Finally, we consider the effect of allowing for pre-existing real annuity policies in this
setting. We assume that the 65-year-old man has both 100 in accumulated assets and the
claim to a real annuity with an expected present value of 100; that is, Wf his wealth is
annuitized. We then repeat the calculation allowing this individual to purchase a real or
nominal annuity, and find the reduction in wealth that would lead to the same expected utility
Ievd if tha annuity market were avahble.
Yhis doas not represent the optimal consumption @icy in the presence of lifetime
uncertainty, except in special cases. When period-by-period utility is given by U = log c,, and
the individual’s time preference rate is zero, for example, the optimal consumption profile
involves consuming wealth/(life expectancy) in each period. We focus on this consumption
rule even in cases when it is not optimal because it is a simple rule, analogous to some
withdrawal roles from retirement saving accounts such as IRAs, that individuals might easily
implement.32
TaUe 14 presents the results of these calculations. The upper panel considers the case
in which real annuities are available in the private market, and the lower panel considers the
case of ntinal annuities. The first entry, for the log utility (#?= 1) case, shows that with
a three percent real interest rate and an annual discount rate of one percent, with no “pre-
existing” annuity, an individual would receive the same lifetime expected utfity if he had
waalth of 100 and no access to a real annuity market, or wealth of 64.0 and access to such
a market. A 65-year-old man would be prepared to give up 36 percent of his wealth if he
could purchase a real annuity rather than consume according to the reciprocal life expectancy
role. This finding, and the other results in the table for different parameter values, is broadly
consistent with the results from the Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) study. Higher risk aversion
values increasa the share of wealth that the individd would be prepared to give up to obtain
access to an actuarially fair annuity market.31
The lower panel of Table 14 presents results for nominal rather than real annuities.
The waalth equivalent rasults are similar to those for the red annuity case, although
individuals wouJd not be prepared to forego as much wealth if they cdd purchase nominal
as if they CM purchase real annuities. The effect of a~owing for a pre-existing red annuity
stream on h weaJth equiv~nt measure is small, as can be seen from the differences
between the wealti aquiva&nts in ths first and seed columns of Tati 14.
These findings, wtila based on a stylized model, generally suggest that individuals
receiva substantial expected utility benefits from purchasing annuity contracts, at least in
standard models. They draw attention to the limited fraction of TIAA-CREF annuitants who
31Further analysis of the utility gain from annuitization, considering the case of married
cou~s as well as individuals, along with updated information on the actuarial present
di=ountad value of currentl y-available individual annuit y contracts, ma y be found in MitcheH,
Poterba, and Warshawsky (1 996).33
rem that they woufd use a lump sum windfall to purchase an additional annuity.
5. Cotions and E~
More than half of U.S. households between the agesof51 and61 currently participate
in some form of sdfdirected retiement saving account. The financial management decisions
of houaahdds with these accounts can provide msi atvidence on the how houaahdds might
manage funds in a mandatory private saving system. Wa consider two aspects of financial
management: asset allocation between stocks and bonds, and demand for annuities. With
respect to the choice between stocks and bonds, we find that the aggregate fraction of
401 (k) or IRA assets that are held in stocks is smahr, by approximate y ten percentage
points, than the equity fraction held by defined benefit pension fund managers. One notabfe
feature of 401(k) investment patterns is that they involve more holdings of own-company
stock, and less investment in diversified portfolios of common stocks or international eqtities,
than defined benefit plan portfolios. The share of401 (k) and IRA assets allocated to equities,
either via direct stock holding or through investment with intermediaries such as mutual funds,
has increasad signif~dy -e tha kte 1980s. There are clear age-related and incorne-
rehtad @erm in asnt dl~tion: higher incQma ~s, and younger participants in
retiement sav~ -, tend to hdd a higher fr~ti~ of their asaats in equities.
Whik these f-s provide some evidence on asset allocation, they must be
interpreted with caution for two important reasons. Ftist, pfan participants do not have
compfete investment discretion with ra~ct to aJl assets in 401 (k) ~ans, as they do with
assets in Individual Retirement Accounts. Some 401 (k) pfans involve restrictions on asset
choice, such as rules that employer contributions must be invested in employer stock. A
related issue may arise in analyzing allocations for TIAA-CREF participants, some of whom34
face restrictions on the allocation of account inflows. Asset allocation patterns in IRAs may
therefore provide a better indicator of unconstrained asset choice than decisions in existing
employment-linked retirement saving plans.
A second difficulty in interpreting existing asset allocation decisions is that these
decisions are made in an envirmment in which individuals expect to receive a real annuity,
Social Security, which provides a floor on their consumption opportunities. Because some
mandatory saving plans would scale back at least part of the existing Social Security system,
it is possible that portfolio allocation decisions in such an environment would differ from those
under the currant system. This is an issue that can be analyzed under specific assumptims
about tha nature of individual’s utility fwtions, the distribution of returns avaiJable to them,
and the nature of Social Security.
This paper also prasents ~ evidence on the damand for annuities by participants
in the TIAA-CREF system, which provides retirement benefits for employees of educational
institutions. Roughly one quarter of TIAA-CREF annuitants in the late 1980s, a group of
individuals who already receive income from annuitis, indicated that if thy received a
$100,000 windfa~, they would use these funds to purchase an ~ annuity. Our
anaJysis of a cross-sactional survey of thasa Tl~-CREF annuitants reveals few strong
cwrelates of this demand for additional annuities; married individuals are less likely to demand
an additional annuity, and there is weak evidence that those with higher levels of net worth
would be less likely to annuitize a windfall.
An impwant issue, that we have unfortunately been unable to find data to ~alyze,
concerm the choice between annuities and otbr payout options by individds who have
accumulated assets in retirement saving plans. Participants in the Health and Retirement
Survey, who were between the ages of 51 and 61, report that in eight percent of the cases35
when they left previous employers who had offered defined contribution ~ans, they chose to
distribute plan assets by purchasing an annuity. This sample is too young to provide a clear
Wspactive on tb decisions made by individuals who reach rettiement with Wstantial assets
accumulated in a self-directed retirement saving account.
Even if it were possible to accurately measure the fraction of assets that are annuitized
in this way, it is not clear how this informatti would bear on individual choicas under a
system of mandatory saving accounts. For Precidy the reasons noted above, any prop-l
that scales back the real annuity associated with the existing Social Security system may
affect individual demand for annuities. It is not clear what model to use in evaluating this
issue. In simple Iife%ycle models, individuals with access to actuarially fair annuity markets
should annuitiza all of their wealth at retirement. However, these models may not provide
a realistic guida to individual behavior. In models with bequest motives, private annuity
markets that do not offer actuarially fair annuities, and uncertainty regarding future health
risks and associated consumption needs, individuals might choose not to fully annuitize.
Analyzing how individuals would decide between annuities and other distribution options
requires a tiel that incorporates thesa featwes. In addition, as Diamond (1994) notes, one
of tha kay eons about a system of privately~naged saving accounts is what annuity
policies wdl ba offered by pfivate insurers in this setting. Considering general equilibrium
effects in ths annuity market corn~icates the analysis even fwther.Access Research, 1995,
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Table 1: IRA and 401 (k) Pafiici~tion, By Age and Inaome, 1991
AW Catego~






















































































































-c.: Potarba, Vanti, ti Wiaa(1996a). Tabtitims ar. W on 1091 SIPP.41
Tab4e 2: Prevalence of Retirement Saving Arrangements in HRS Popdation
..--... -.— ..- —--- . ..... .......... . ..------- ... .. .......... ..........................
IRA 401(k) IRA and Other
only only DC Only 401 (k) Multi~ None
< 10K 23.6% 2.0% 3.9% 2.7% 3.2%
10-20K 19.3 5.3 6.4 2.4 2.6
20-30K 24,2 5.3 7.2 5.9 6.0
30-40K 28.4 6.6 7.2 7.4 6.6
40-50K 31.3 8.0 7.2 7.3 9.1
50-75K 33.6 6.6 6.1 11.4 12.8
> 75K 42.7 4.1 4.4 15.8 19.0
ALL CATEGORIES 28.7 5.3 6.0 7.4 8.4










Notes: Au-s cslcdations usi~ Health W Retirement Survey data base. Income is defined
as the sum of wage income, professional practice income, and income from a second job; it
is essentially a labor income concept. The unit of measurement is the household.42
TaMe 3: Share of IRA, SRA, or Defined Contribution Pension Assets in Equities, 1992
IRAs 401 (k)s and 403(b)s Traditional DC Hans
.— ---- --.. --.-— ——— ..... —-—-.--—-- —. ... .............--. -—--. —--------.-
< 35 50.5% 44.7% 47.9%
354 50.4 44.5 46.4
45-54 51.7 49.3 50.8
55-64 51.7 45.4 49.1
B 65 33.0 39.8 49.6
< 30 32.4% 37.5% 45.4%
30-50 41.4 41.8 47.7
50-100 47.2 38.1 49.2
> 100 52.2 56.0 50.0
Total 46.5 46.8 49.1
-.- .... —...--. ..- —... ............................. ....................................................----
-cc: Authors’ tabulati- from 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances. SCF reWondents
with IRAIs ara asked wbti their assets are held in various asset categwies, such as “Bank
Accounts, CDs, ~ Money Market Funds,” “Stocks, - “Bonds,” “A Com~tim of Stocks
and Hs,” etc. TM fraction holding stocks is computed by adding together all holdings of
those who rem that they hdd stocks, and 1/N times the holdings of those who re~ing
investing in c~tions of N assets, one of which is stocks. For example, half of the assets
of indivm reporting “A Combination of Stocks and Bonds” is added to the equity total.
For 401 (k), 403(b), and other defined cmtribution pension fund investments, tha options are
“-y in stocks, “ ‘mostly b bonds, n and “split bet wean. ” We add those as~ts that are
hdd mostly in stocks to half of the assets that are “split between” to compute the total equity
invastmant in these accounts. The 401 (k) and 403(b) category also includes assets in
Supplemental Retirement Accounts; the Traditional DC Pension Plan entries include ESOPS and
profit sharing plans.43
Tabla 4: Distributti of IRA Assats, 1989 and 1994
——. .—---- ....... ..- —. ..-. ---------- .-—---—— .. ..................
Intarmetiry or Assat 1989 1994
CHercial Ba* 21.8% 14.5%
Thrifts 21.5 8.0
Ufa Insurance cm- 8.3 8.2
Mutual Funds 24.6 31.1
- Equity Funds 11.5 16.7
- -y Market Funds 5.6 8.7
- 8und & Iwome Funds 7.5 5.6
Other Sdf-Directd 18.1 34.6
..-—— —-— ----- .-. — --------- . .......- ----------------- ............................................----
~ce: Investmnt Company Institute (1995).44
Table 5: Assat Allocation in 401 (k) P18ns
—...—-. .——---— --------- -—-..-- —.-—.--— ...... ..... .......---------------- --------- -----
Panel A: Access Research (1995)
1991 1993
Corporate Equities 11% 16% 21%
Cmpany Stock 26 24 22
GJCS 31 27 23
Balanced Funds 13 13 14
MS 5 7 8
Money Markat Funds 9 7 6
Other 6 6 6
Panel B: RogersCasey and Institute of Management and Administration (1995)
1988 m m
Cwporate Equitias 43 47 55
GICS 44 38 28
Balanced, MS & cash 13 15 17
Sourca: Various reports as indicated ti references.45
Table 6: Investment in 401 (k) Asset Categories, by Investment AvailaMty
———..- .— —.-.—--.-.--—- -------------------------- ...........................-
Use Given
Investment Option Availability Available























































Source: Access Rasaarch (1995).46
Table 7: Allocation of Funds in 401 (k) Investment ~ns, By Pafiici~nt Age
Age Group
Investment
Categwy 21-30 3140 41-50 51-60 > 60 Total
Stock Funds 39.1% 36.4% 29.7% 22.0% 9.5% 25.3%
Company Stock 11.0 8.9 6.1 5.8 2.7 6.1
Ianational
Stock Funds 2.8 3.1 3.8 2.5 1.2 2.8
Fixed-Income
Futula 41.4 43.4 49.4 61.5 85.2 58.1
Oa{anced Funds 5.7 8.2 11.0 8.3 1.3 7.8
-.—--..-. — ---. -.—.. — —......-. --.....-- ........------------------- ...................-.
Source: Goodfellow and Schiuber (1996).47
Table 8: Mocation of Funds in 401 (k) Investment flans
..... ...— .--- —-. —-------- ............ ...... ...--------- ...................... ....
Income Group
lnv8stmant
Categwy <15 15-25 25-35 35-45 45-60 60-75 75-100 100+
.-— ——-— .-- —--—-.-. -------------------------------------------------
Stock Funds 24.6 21.5 19.5 18.6 25.3 42.2 45.4 52.0
Company Stock 6.5 7.6 8.2 6.6 7.6 10.6 7.9 2.3
International
Stock Funds 0.6 0.8 1.7 1.6 2.0 3.9 6.1 10.2
Fixed-lncoma
Funds 62.1 63.0 61.6 66.7 53.2 32.2 26.0 27.2
~ Funds 5.9 7.2 9.0 6.5 12.0 11.1 14.7 8.4
--. — ——. .._ -.-- —-... ——. -.--------- ................... .............. ..................
~ce: GoodfeUow and Schiebar (1996).Tabla 9: Mcipatiun In, and Salary Daferrd Rates In,
Fadaral Employee Retirement System
-V *cat of Faderal Em~yaaa Dafarral Rate If Mking
Range rblaki~ voluntary Contiibutim Vo&n* Contributim







70 + 96 7.2
Au 73 5.7
...-— —-—.-— —-. — --.. ——----- -------- ....................... -----------------
Source: -d Accounting Office (1995).49
TaMe 10: Bonds vs. Equity: Current Investment Decisions and Asset Balances
of TIAA-CREF Pafiicipants
Age or Income Percentage of Contrib- Percentage of Assets
in 1993 utions in TIAA Accounts in TIAA Accounts







65 + 53 57
Income:





> 100 34 40
...- .-— . ............ ............................................ ........................................----
~urce: Unpu-d tabulations from the 1993 Premium Paying Research Panel, TIAA/CREF
Paftic~ts, courtesy of Brett Hammond.50
Table 11: Participant-Level Models for Shre of TIAA-CREF Assets in TIAA
Constant 67.33 49.19 62.81
(6.68) (4.99) (6.92)
Age -0.07 0.05 0.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Married -0.05 0.88 0.28
(2.02) (2.02) (2.03)
Fiamale 4.07 4.76 3.70
(1 .84) (1.79) (1 .86)
25-50K 2.12 2.02 2.02
(2.14) (2.14) (2.15)
50-1 00K -1.86 -1.48 -1.11
(2.12) (2.14) (2.15)
> 100K -6.76 -5.92 -5,21
(2.70) (2.79) (2.79)
12-16 YWS -10.15 -9.54
(5.04) (5.04)
16 Yaars -11.97 -10.76
(4.78) (4.79)










> 500K -5.66 -4.84
(2.54) (2.56)
Adj. R2 0.0275 0.0260 0.0306
-------------------------------- ...................................................................................
Notes: All equations are estimated on a sampJe of 1190 observations in the 1988 TIAA-CREF
Participant Survey. Statiard errors are ~own in parentheses.51
Table 12: TIAA-CREF Annuitant Responses to “How WouJd You Spand a $100,000 Windfall?”
Spend h Amount Annually Consume
Buy An Annuity Over 8-12 Years M More Than Income




































































































Notes: All equations are estimated on 310 observations with complete data on annuity
demand in tha 1988 TIAA-CREF Participant Survey. Standard errors are in parentheses.52
Tam 13: Annuity Choices of TIAA-CREF Annuitants, 1978 and 1994
Annuity Type 1978 1994 1978 1994















































----------------------- ...... —.—----- ...........---------------------------------------
Source: Personal communication from Francis P. King at TIAA-CREF.Table 14: Wealth-EquivaJant Value of Annuities
Compared To “1/Life Expectancy” Consumption Plan
No Real Pre-Existing Raal
Annuity Ba- Annuity Equal Half of Net Worth
-—--- -.. ——--—-.
Log Utility Casa
r = .03, d = .01
r = .03, J = .03
r = .05, 6 = .03
fl=2Case
r = .03, d = .01
r = .03. d = .03
















r = .03, d = .01 .672 .688
r = .03, ~ = .03 .679 .689
r = .05, 6 s .03 .700 .702
fl=2Caaa
r = .03, d = .01 .538 .684
r = .03, 6 = .03 .591 .687
r = .05, 6 = .03 .659 .703
Notes: Each entry shows the wealth required at aga 65 to achieve the same expected lifetime
utility as in tha case without an annuity market, with a wealth at age 65 of 1, - when the
tividual c~es (wealthfife expectancy) each period.